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Why do social democrats choose neoliberal labor market policies? Since social democrats
are typically punished for welfare state retrenchment and because these policies do not
equate well with social democratic egalitarian principles, it is difficult to see what they
gain from it. We argue that, depending on the intra-party balance of power between
activists and leaders, some parties are office-seeking, whereas others are policy-seeking.
This behavioral difference explains why some parties are responsive to environmental
incentives such as the economy and public opinion (office-seeking parties) and others
are responsive to policy-motivated activists (policy-seeking parties). Using three case
studies of social democratic parties (Germany, the Netherlands and Spain) in the period
1980–2010, we analyze when and why these parties introduced neoliberal reforms.
The study shows that office-seeking parties introduce neoliberal measures if the risk of
losing votes due to an underperforming economy becomes larger than the risk of losing
votes due to the mobilization of unions and opposition parties. Policy-seeking social
democrats retain a social democratic ideology, unless prolonged failure to win office
empowers pragmatic leaders to push through office-seeking strategies.
Keywords: social democratic parties; welfare reform; party organization
Introduction
Ever since Pierson (1996) claimed that all-out welfare state retrenchment was
risky given the electoral punishment associated with it, researchers have been at
pains to explain cases in which governments introduced cut-backs in the welfare
state. Particularly puzzling are those cases in which social democrats retrenched.
Since the electorate punishes social democrats for welfare state retrenchment
(Schumacher et al., forthcoming), and a less generous welfare state does not
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equate well with traditional social democratic goals, it is difficult to see what
social democrats gain with welfare state cut-backs. The rich literature on the
consequences of social democratic government participation for welfare state
generosity has produced inconclusive results. Although some studies find a general
positive effect of social democratic incumbency (Allan and Scruggs, 2004), there
has been a tendency for some social democrats to support neoliberal reforms, such
as reductions of unemployment benefits and more flexible dismissal protection
(Green-Pedersen et al., 2001).
Our question is why social democrats engage in this kind of reform. Environ-
mental incentives – such as party competition (Kitschelt, 2001), economic crises
(Vis, 2009) or public opinion shifts (Stimson et al., 1995) – help to explain some
cases. Nevertheless, social democratic parties have had different policy responses to,
for example, the economic crises of the late 1970s, ranging from traditional social
democratic approaches to neoliberal reforms. We explain this variation by studying
intra-party conflict between office-motivated leaders and policy-motivated activists.
Environmental conditions, such as the threat of economic voting against the govern-
ment, may motivate party leaders to push for neoliberal reforms to serve their office
goals. Activists, on the other hand, push for traditional social democratic goals,
regardless of the state of the economy. In the end, the balance of power between
activists and leaders decides the policy response.
We explain the link between environmental incentives and the intra-party balance
of power by analyzing the reform trajectories of social democratic parties in three
European countries: the Social Democratic Party in Germany (Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands, SPD); the Labour Party in the Netherlands (Partij van de
Arbeid, PvdA); and the Socialist Party in Spain (Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol,
PSOE). As will be argued, the literature is theoretically and empirically ambiguous
about the agency of social democrats in labor market reforms and for that reason we
focus on these parties in this paper (Schmidt, 1996). We concentrate on a key policy
area for social democrats – labor market policy. We broadly define our dependent
variable as the difference between what is commonly understood as neoliberal
reforms (unemployment benefit retrenchment and employment deregulation) and
traditional social democratic approaches toward the labor market (maintaining
benefit generosity and employment regulation). We focus on turning points in which
parties switch from social democratic to neoliberal approaches or vice versa. Both in
partisan orientation and voter orientation, labor market policies are more divisive
than other areas of the welfare state. While the elderly and those suffering from bad
health are usually considered as the ‘deserving poor’, the unemployed are more often
seen as ‘undeserving’ (e.g. Van Oorschot, 2006). Hence, there is more consensus
about insuring against income deprivation in cases of old age and sickness than in
the case of unemployment. Moreover, the mass unemployment of past decades
pressured policy makers to reform the institutional framework of the labor market.
For these reasons labor market policies are a fertile ground to test hypotheses
about office-seeking and policy-seeking behavior. Our independent variables are
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environmental incentives, which include public opinion shifts, economic conditions,
and party competition. Their importance is mediated by the intra-party balance of
power, with the expectation of leadership dominance being associated with a higher
responsiveness to these incentives. Our cases represent different types of intra-party
balances of power, which allows us to analyze the implications of our proposition
(Kitschelt, 1994).
We show that office-seeking social democrats retrench once an underperforming
economy endangers the party’s electoral position. Policy-seeking social democrats
do not retrench, but do experience party organizational change if prolonged
exclusion from office enfranchises more pragmatic elites at the expense of policy-
seeking activists. This feedback effect transforms a policy-seeking party into
an office-seeking party. We contribute to the retrenchment literature by indicating
that different intra-party balances of power elicit different policy responses. This
leads to a better understanding of the seemingly inconsistent behavior of social
democratic parties – both cross-sectionally and across time.
Social democrats and neoliberal reforms
Social democratic parties are traditionally seen as agents of the working class,
thus pursuing expansion of social benefits and employment regulation (Korpi,
1983; Huber and Stephens, 2001). In this perspective, varying levels of welfare
state generosity are primarily explained by the relative strength of social demo-
crats and other left-wing parties vis-a`-vis conservative or liberal parties, which
represent business interests. Hence, partisanship is seen as a key explanatory
factor of labor market policy change.
Arguing that fiscal pressures since the late 1970s have changed the logic of
welfare state politics, the new politics literature challenges the explanatory power
of partisanship (Pierson, 1996). Without the possibilities for large-scale budgetary
expansion, the left can no longer expand the welfare state, while the right refrains
from welfare state retrenchment because even their constituents have become
supporters of the welfare state. As a result, partisan differences recede. While
there is evidence of a declining role of partisan differences (e.g. Huber and
Stephens, 2001; Kittel and Obinger, 2003), evidence in other literature indicates
that social democrats are more likely than liberals and conservatives to cut-back
on the welfare state and deregulate the labor market. Because of their positive role
in welfare state expansion, social democrats have greater credibility to adapt
existing policies and institutions responsibly. Hence, voters trust reformist social
democrats to find a balanced mode of modernization – a level of trust liberal and
conservative parties do not enjoy. This provides social democrats with greater
leeway for reforms than openly liberal governments (Levy, 1999; Ross, 2000).
Social democrats exploit this leeway in order to maintain welfare state support as
their crucial power resource (Klitgaard, 2007). On the other hand it has also been
argued that social democrats in post-industrial societies focus on their traditional
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core constituency (male workers in manufacturing). To sustain acquired privileges
for this group, social democrats are willing to enforce insider–outsider divisions,
for instance by deregulating temporary forms of employment while maintaining
protection for regular workers (Rueda, 2007).
However, claims of a neutral (or even positive) impact of social democratic
government participation on retrenchment are contested. Various empirical studies
show persistent partisan differences, with left-wing incumbency still positively
correlated to welfare state generosity (Korpi, 2003; Allan and Scruggs, 2004;
Amable et al., 2006).
Hence, existing research is theoretically and empirically ambiguous about the
agency of social democrats with regards to neoliberal labor market reforms. In
other words, what is the motivation for social democrats to introduce neoliberal
reforms? Social democrats may respond to right-wing public opinion shifts
or anticipate electoral punishment for poor economic performance. This might
explain why socio-economic pressures (e.g. unemployment) translate into
retrenchment (Vis, 2009; Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). Kitschelt (2001) shows that
the spatial configuration of party systems shapes the possibilities for social
democrats to reform without getting punished. However, these are office-seeking
reasons for why social democrats retrench. They do not take into account that
party leaders may fail to convince policy-motivated activists of the necessity of
shifting to a neoliberal approach (Mu¨ller and Strøm, 1999).1 Hence, parties
should not be analyzed as unitary actors, as is often assumed in political-economy
approaches to retrenchment (Merkel and Petring, 2008). In the following section
we develop an explanation of why social democrats embark on neoliberal
reforms, taking into account the intra-party balance of power.
Social democrats and the intra-party balance of power
Parties care about both policies and office (Mu¨ller and Strøm, 1999). Therefore, the
(dis)utility of retrenchment for a party lies in the effect the measure has on the sum
of the party’s office and policy pay-offs.2 Hence, parties enact a retrenchment
measure if they believe that the measure will have a positive effect on the party’s
pay-off. Not every party values office and policy pay-offs to the same extent
(Mu¨ller and Strøm, 1999). Achieving policy goals often presupposes access to
office, but is a party in office to achieve policy goals or office goals (Budge and
Laver, 1986)? Parties sometimes have to make hard choices between policies that
serve office goals and policies that serve ideological goals. Which approach a party
adopts is influenced by the intra-party balance of power (Harmel et al., 1995).
1 Kitschelt (2001) does acknowledge that party organization constrains the strategic flexibility of
party leaders.
2 Vote pay-offs are also important, but votes are only instrumental in obtaining office or imple-
menting policy. Hence, we consider vote-seeking behavior as part of the more general behavior of office-
seeking.
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In one extreme a party is completely dominated by exclusively policy-motivated
activists3 and therefore only accepts the party’s policy preference as government
policy. Standard social democratic ideology dictates high levels of generosity and
strong employment regulation. If party activists dictate party policy, we expect that
these activists choose policies along the lines of standard social democratic ideology
or seek to retain the policy choices already made in that direction (Hypothesis 1).
HYPOTHESIS 1: If party activists are dominant, social democrats retain social
democratic policies.
In the other extreme, a party only cares about office pay-offs and has no policy
preference. To obtain or maintain office pay-offs, a party needs votes and, if
necessary, coalition partners. To keep (or first win) votes, the party should support
policies that are supported by a large number of voters. But public opinion can
shift. Bad economic performance (i.e. rising inflation or unemployment) is known
to influence the short-term decision to vote for or against the incumbent, that is,
retrospective economic voting (Duch and Stevenson, 2008). More generally,
voters dissatisfied with economic performance can be expected to shift to the right
and become favorable to liberal or conservative policies. In such cases social
democratic parties, whether in office or in opposition, must consider neoliberal
policies to prevent losing office pay-offs, since the (rightwards shifting) center of
a policy distribution has the highest density of voters. Capturing the center of a
policy distribution should be a sufficient condition for winning elections in a
majoritarian electoral system. However, in proportional representation systems,
adopting centrist policies ensures that one is proximate to other parties, which
helps the formation of a multiparty coalition. Hence, in both electoral systems
social democrats have an office-seeking incentive to shift to the center.
However, if opposition parties or unions mobilize effectively against a social
democratic government intending to retrench, it severely damages the prospects of
social democrats remaining in office (either by losing votes or coalition partners –
or both). If there is a party as pro-welfare as social democrats (left-libertarian
parties, Christian democrats), voters have an alternative to vote for once they
become dissatisfied with the neoliberal policies of the social democrats. Labor
unions can also become instrumental in mobilizing public opinion against
social democrats. However, if unions and opposition parties fail to mobilize
public opinion or are not credible, social democrats do not need to fear electoral
punishment and subsequent departure from office. Hence, in economically trou-
bled times party leaders face a choice between losing votes due to economic
mismanagement or due to punishment for implementing unpopular policies.
3 Party activists invest blood, sweat, and tears in the party without an immediate reward in terms of
income, prestige, and rents. Hence, activists are policy-motivated. The leader has an interest in getting
into government because it brings income, prestige, and rents. Hence, the leader is office-motivated
(Mu¨ller and Strøm, 1999).
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If leaders calculate that the impact of the economy on their future office pay-offs is
larger than the impact of credible opposition mobilization, then social democratic
party leaders shift to neoliberal policies (Hypothesis 2). If there is no economic
crisis, or credible opposition mobilization, leaders refrain from shifting towards
neoliberal policies.
HYPOTHESIS 2: If party leaders are dominant, poor economic performance and the
absence of left-wing mobilization motivate party leaders to adopt
neoliberal policies.
The choice for a particular labor market strategy may result in election defeat,
exclusion from office or even party splits. Such negative feedback effects can
persuade either side (activists or leaders) that a different strategy is necessary – or
they enfranchise new, more pragmatic or more ideological groups at the expense
of older groups. Hence, there is a dynamic interaction between policy choices and
their success. These strategic choices change the distribution of power and
enfranchise groups that shift the party’s strategy from office-seeking to policy-
seeking or vice versa (Hypothesis 3).
HYPOTHESIS 3: Negative feedback effects from earlier labor market choices
prompt parties to shift from office-seeking to policy-seeking stra-
tegies or vice versa.
Methods and case selection
To answer the question ‘Why do social democrats retrench?’, we analyze the
trajectory of the PSOE, SPD, and PvdA social democrats in the period 1975–2010.
We select this time frame because social democrats in this period had to adapt from
the politics of ever-expanding government budgets to the more restricted politics of
austerity (Pierson, 1996). We choose the case study method because the theoretical
concepts of interest are context-dependent and should therefore be analyzed from a
qualitative perspective. Although a quantitative or formal analysis would surely
yield interesting results, the explicit goal here is to conduct an in-depth investigation
into intra-party decision-making. The diachronic perspective of each case study
allows us to incorporate the feedback effects of earlier decisions.
Table 1. Operationalization of independent variables
Independent variables Reasons for retrenchment
Public opinion (shift) Right-wing shift
Credible opposition, union mobilization Absence of opposition and union mobilization
Economic conditions High inflation or high unemployment
(Change in) intra-party balance of power (Shift to) leadership domination
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The unit of analysis is the turning point signifying a party’s departure from a pre-
vious policy trajectory. We identify turning points by comparing actual policy (or the
presentation of policy choices in party manifestos) with earlier policy choices. Coherent
reversals in language and policy decisions signify a turning point. In each case study we
indicate what explains turning points and the absence of a turning point, that is, the
continuation of the status quo. As stated in the previous section, our explanatory
variables are economic context, public opinion, and credible opposition mobilization,
with the intra-party balance of power considered an intervening variable.
We selected the PSOE, SPD, and PvdA because they cover meaningful variation
in terms of the intra-party balance of power. Kitschelt (1994) combines two expert
survey questions about the balance of power between party leaders and party
activists to create a ratio measure of the intra-party balance of power between
activists and leaders.4 Using this measurement, the PSOE is identified as a strong
office-seeking party and the PvdA as a policy-seeking party. Therefore we expect the
PSOE to follow the predictions of H2 and the PvdA to follow the predictions of H1.
The SPD has a value in-between these two extremes – therefore, we expect it to
zigzag between office-seeking (H2) and policy-seeking (H1) motivations. Further-
more, Kitschelt (1994) compares this expert survey to more qualitative measures of
party organization. He finds that policy-seeking parties such as the PvdA are char-
acterized by decentralization, union linkage and the presence of left-wing factions.
Conversely, office-seeking parties such as the PSOE are centralized, have no linkages
with civil society organizations and no significant intra-party factions. Choosing
parties from three different organizational types allows us to make some tentative
generalizations about party behavior in general.
Netherlands: initial radicalization, eventual moderation
We start our analysis with the PvdA, a party which has been characterized
as a policy-seeking party (Kitschelt, 1994; Hillebrand and Irwin, 1999). In
the mid-1960s the PvdA was moderately left-wing. There had been increasing
frustration with the lack of electoral success and the compromises the party had to
make when in office. The PvdA advocated welfare state expansion, but was duly
aware of the inflationary consequences of excessive government spending, as their
efforts to curb spending in the 1965–66 cabinet under Cals demonstrate (van
Praag, 1990). At the same time, an influential paper from the party’s research
bureau argued that the welfare state did not alleviate social inequality and poverty
still persisted (Bleich, 1986; van Praag, 1990). In the late 1960s a group of young
party activists emerged from the party and called themselves the New Left (Nieuw
Links). Frustrated with the politics of accommodation, they complained that the
4 To be precise, the first question asks experts whether party leaders are influential in setting party
policy; the second questions asks whether party activists are influential in setting party policy (Laver and
Hunt, 1992).
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PvdA swapped office pay-offs for policy purity too anxiously. They demanded a
more democratic party and a stronger emphasis on social and economic equality
(Wolinetz, 1977). Because the party elites partly agreed with the New Left and
because they feared party split-offs, the party elite gave in to some of the demands
(Bleich, 1986; van Praag, 1990; van Praag, 1994). The activism and media connec-
tions of the New Left also gave them a powerful position in relation to the party elite
and the more aloof, older party members (Wolinetz, 1977). This informal change in
the balance of power between new party activists and the old party elite elicited
formal changes in the intra-party balance of power. In 1969 the candidate selection
procedure was decentralized to powerful regional councils, which operated inde-
pendently of the party executive (Koole and Leijenaar, 1988; van Praag, 1994).5 It
was also decided that only a limited number of members of parliament (MPs) were
to be allowed on the party executive board (van Praag, 1990). Both changes limited
the power of the party leadership in favor of the party activists. Consequently, the
New Left penetrated all layers of the party organization and demanded extensive
programmatic commitments (Wolinetz, 1977; van Praag, 1990).
Triggered by a negative feedback effect of the office-seeking strategy of accom-
modation (Hypothesis 3), these shifts in the intra-party balance of power led to the
adoption of a new policy-seeking strategy of polarization (van Praag, 1990, 1994;
Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002). It was believed by some that by
emphasizing left-right differences support for the centrist confessional parties would
plummet and the PvdA would gain, and that in combination with other parties
(Democraten 66, Politieke Partij Radikalen, and Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij) a
progressive majority could be a distinct possibility (van Praag, 1990). This new
strategy to obtain policy and office pay-offs marks an important turning point.
There was a strong preference for welfare state expansion, and the power of the
activists vis-a`-vis the party leadership ensured policy purity. Hence, office was less
important than ideology. In addition, supporting the welfare state brought the PvdA
a gain in votes (from 37 seats in 1967 to 52 seats in 1986). Consequently, the PvdA
proposed rather dramatic demands in coalition negotiations till 1989 (van Praag,
1990) and radicalized its demands for social welfare (Schumacher, forthcoming),
even when the economic crisis of the 1970s meant a rising budget deficit and ever
increasing government debt.
In terms of office pay-offs the strategy worked only once during the progressive
Den Uyl cabinet, from 1972 to 1977, which needed parliamentary support from
the confessional parties. The PvdA was expelled from government between 1977
and 1989 with the exception of a brief interlude in 1981. In that year the party
leader, Den Uyl, was probably convinced that the utility of retrenchment was
5 Initially, the party executive put forward a list of candidates to its members for consultation.
However, these members were less inclined to oppose the party leadership than the New Left. This
radically changed in 1969 when independently operating regional councils, filled with party activists,
were appointed to decide on candidate selection (Koole and Leijenaar, 1988).
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greater than the utility of the status quo because he negotiated a cut on sickness
benefits.6 However, the party and the unions resisted reform and eventually the
party chairman, Max van den Berg, forced the PvdA ministers to resign from the
cabinet (Bleich, 1986). Following Hypothesis 1, policy-motivated activists
ensured that policy purity took precedence over office pay-offs. By stressing the
anti-social character of the welfare state cut-backs by the first and second Lubbers
governments, the PvdA was even able to play up its pro-welfare position during
this period (Schumacher, forthcoming). This was well received by the voters, but
left the party bereft of coalition partners. Eventually, this heralded the second
turning point in the PvdA’s welfare reform trajectory.
Deprived of policy influence and the spoils of office, the PvdA implemented drastic
changes in the period 1989–92. Radical party activists had become more moderate
and the PvdA electorate shifted to the right (Wolinetz, 1993; Schumacher, forth-
coming). This negative feedback effect (Hypothesis 3) changed the balance of power
within the party. A number of internal reports [Schuivende Panelen (PvdA, 1987);
Bewogen Beweging (PvdA, 1988)] recognized the failures of polarization. However,
recommendations for party organizational change were initially rejected by the party
executive (van Praag, 1994). The sudden breakdown of the coalition of the Christian
Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appe`l, CDA) and the People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) in 1989
forced the PvdA to fight an election unreformed but with a new leader, Wim Kok.
The PvdA mildly toned down its social welfare program and now proposed that in
some areas the status quo in entitlements was acceptable instead of expansion
(Schumacher, forthcoming). Since the CDA had also moved towards the position of
the PvdA, they were able to form a coalition government (Lucardie and Voerman,
1989). Intended as a cabinet with a social image that would not engage in welfare
state retrenchment, the third government led by Lubbers was quickly confronted with
an unexpectedly high budget deficit. In 1991 almost a million people lived off
disability benefits and a further million received unemployment benefits. In the
summer of 1991 the cabinet put forward a drastic measure: for all people below
50 the worker disability benefit would be gradually decreased to 70 percent of
the minimum wage – previously this had been 70 percent of last-earned income
(Green-Pedersen et al., 2001). Party activists and unions protested, yet the PvdA
congress eventually agreed to this drastic measure when Wim Kok forced the
congress to choose between him or the retrenchment (van Praag, 1994).
Winning 80 percent of the vote, Wim Kok broke the internal opposition against
retrenchment. Following Hypothesis 2, the office-seeking party leadership believed
retrenchment was preferable to the status quo because its purpose was to signal to the
electorate and the other parties that the PvdA had financially sound policies in order
to safeguard future office pay-offs. Hence, not responding to the budgetary pressures
6 At about the same time voices emerged within the PvdA calling for a new realism in coalition
bargaining strategies, essentially demanding less policy for more office (Bleich, 1986).
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and overwhelming use of welfare benefits would probably have sent the PvdA back
to the opposition benches – once again confirming their financial irresponsibility. Dire
electoral and office prospects motivated the leadership to retrench. Why did party
activists agree? As argued, the moderation of activists and the right-wing shifts of the
PvdA’s members had probably swung back the informal intra-party balance of power
towards favoring office pay-offs instead of policy pay-offs. In addition, there was no
longer a clear policy alternative or a strongly organized left-wing group within the
party. The unions organized exceptionally large demonstrations against government
plans, but failed to obtain significant support from parliament. With the two major
pro-welfare parties in cabinet (the PvdA and CDA), the only alternative for voters
was the smallish Green-Left party.
Shortly after the summer of 1991 17 percent of PvdA members, including
a number of prominent party activists and MPs, decided to leave the party,
further reinforcing the balance of power tilted towards office-seeking behavior (van
Praag, 1994). This also expressed itself in formal party organizational changes. In
two reforms in March 1992 the powerful party council was abolished, and in
December 1992 the party executive was once again made responsible for candidate
selection. The PvdA had once more become a centralized party (van Praag, 1994).
This enabled new, more liberal-oriented ‘Third Way’ politicians to move up to the
party elite level (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002). In the 1994 election
the PvdA drastically moved towards the center and even formed a coalition with the
liberal party (VVD). The content of its party manifesto shifted completely from
emphasizing decommodification to stressing efficiency and more liberal issues such
as freedom of choice (Schumacher, forthcoming). By shifting to the center the PvdA
lost votes but won office, as it had enhanced its strategic position within the party
system. With a centralized leadership and a more centrist electorate, the PvdA
leadership was now in a position to implement retrenchment. The first government
of Wim Kok, still responding to the economic difficulties of the early 1990s,
introduced a relaxation in statutory dismissal protection for regular workers and
tightened eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits (Green-Pedersen et al., 2001).
His second cabinet implemented only a few reforms, aimed at the flexibilization of
the labor market (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002), because the economy
had picked up considerably. After the second government under Wim Kok, the
PvdA continued a moderate stance vis-a`-vis the labor market and the welfare state,
supporting occasional retrenchment when deemed necessary.7
Spain: immediate moderation
Now we analyze the trajectory of an office-seeking party, the Spanish PSOE.
Emerging out of the shadows of the Francoist era the PSOE initially adopted a
7 The PvdA intended to reform the party organization after 2002 and make it more open to members
and new ideas. However, in terms of party organization only cosmetic changes were implemented.
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Marxist stance. Its slogan in 1976 was ‘mass, Marxist and democratic’, and it even
operated, arguably, to the left of the Communist Party (Partido Comunista de
Espan˜a, PCE; Share, 1988). However, the pragmatic leadership around Felipe
Gonza´lez and Alfonse Guerra battled with party activists to strike Marxism off
the party manifesto. They succeeded in this because they disempowered party
activists by changing rules concerning which party members were eligible to vote
at party conferences (Share, 1988). In addition, the closed party list electoral system
in Spain benefits parties’ leadership because it gives them a more prominent role
in candidate selection (Field, 2006). Taking into account the comparatively low
member/vote ratio, the centralization of decision-making, the large patronage net-
works that were effectively built up by the party leadership, and the weak links with
the General Union of Workers (Unio´n General de Trabajadores, UGT), we conclude
that the party leadership was absolutely dominant in decision-making processes
within the PSOE. As a consequence, the PSOE leadership met with few obstacles to
their office-seeking ambitions.
In the 1980s and early 1990s the PSOE did not face a highly competitive
electoral system, despite the fact that Spain has a majoritarian electoral system.
Also, after the rapid demise of the centrist Union of the Democratic Centre (Unio´n
de Centro Democra´tico, UCD) in the early 1980s no real competitor for power
existed. The Peoples Party (Partido Popular, PP) – and its predecessors – were
generally considered to be too far to the right and the communists (and later, to a
lesser extent, the Izquierda Unida) as too radical and too divided (Share, 1988).
Hence, looking both at the intra-party balance of power and the potential for
credible mobilization against the government, the PSOE leadership was in very
comfortable position to capture the center.
The outgoing UCD government had introduced employment legislation (Ley
Ba´sica de Empleo) that strongly decreased levels of unemployment benefit coverage
and unemployment income replacement rate (Gutie´rrez and Guille´n, 2000; Mato,
2011). In its 1982 election platform the PSOE promised job creation, redistribu-
tion of income, vastly increased social expenditure, a 40-hour working week with
30 days of vacation (Share, 1988; Royo, 2000). However, when the PSOE came to
power in 1982 it had to deal with very high levels of unemployment and a very rigid
labor market. Instead, the first government under Felipe Gonza´lez opted for large-
scale austerity measures, shedding large numbers of workers in the industrial sector.
Following Hypothesis 2 the office-seeking PSOE – rather than satisfying the core
social democratic voters – adopted centrist policies in response to economic
decay, and tried to balance the budget and bring down inflation. Both union and
left-wing opposition were very weak at the time and were unable to mobilize sig-
nificant opposition. In 1984, the government addressed the issue of social security
for the unemployed. Although they extended the coverage and generosity of
the benefits system, it was targeted solely at the elderly and agricultural workers
(Mato, 2011). But the government also lowered the maximum unemployment
benefit and introduced labor market deregulation by introducing temporary
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contracts (Gutie´rrez and Guille´n, 2000). In conclusion, the 1984 reforms were
generally not expansionary, and solely benefited important electoral groups (mostly
agricultural workers in Andalucia and Extremadura; Recio and Roca, 1998). In
terms of employment regulation it heralded the first signs of a neoliberal approach.
A more generous expansion of the welfare state came in 1989. The government
extended the duration of unemployment benefits and assistance (Gutie´rrez and
Guille´n, 2000; Mato, 2011). But what triggered this turning point? The unions,
who were initially weak and divided, had managed to organize large-scale strikes
and demonstrations against the government in 1988. Since the economy was
starting to pick up, the unions felt it was time for real social democratic policies
(Share, 1988). The group of supporters around Alfonse Guerra (the Guerristas) had
disapproved of the alienation between the PSOE and the UGTand fears of electoral
reprisals eventually turned the tide within the party (Recio and Roca, 1998).
The 1989 reforms were more of an aberration of PSOE centrist policies
regarding the labor market than a real turning point, and in 1992 and 1993 the
party continued on its course of labor market deregulation. This time they also
combined this with retrenching the unemployment benefit and unemployment
assistance systems. In 1992, the third cabinet under Felipe Gonza´lez decreased
unemployment benefits from 70 percent to 60 percent of the last-earned salary,
reduced the duration of the benefit, reduced the level of social assistance given
after unemployment benefits had ended, and also introduced strict labor market
activation measures. In 1993 they further reduced the scope of unemployment
benefit and social assistance programs. What could have triggered the third
Gonza´lez cabinet to embark on this unpopular course of action? Firstly, there was
little to fear from other parties and intra-party dissent was also weak. The unions
tried to repeat their successes of 1988 but failed. Apparently the sudden weak-
ening of the Spanish economy in 1992, which had pushed up spending on passive
welfare state measures (Gutie´rrez and Guille´n, 2000), combined with stricter
European Union rules with regard to budget deficits, were incentives to implement
deep cuts when the economy stalled. All of which verifies Hypothesis 2.
To provide an intellectual counterweight against the PSOE’s policies, the
Guerristas formulated a manifesto for a social democratic program for the future
(Programa 2000). Despite large numbers of people that contributed to drafting
the manifesto, it remained a factional attempt to set the agenda, which ultimately
failed (Gillespie, 1993).
Gonza´lez led the PSOE from 1974 to 1997. His policies are generally regarded as
neoliberal (Share, 1988; Recio and Roca, 1998). The policies generally benefited the
elderly and agricultural workers at the expense of younger workers, and keeping
spending down appealed to centrist and right-wing voters. With limited options on
both the left and the right, the PSOE managed to gain a strong electoral alliance. By
leading the PSOE from Marx to the market, it managed to stay in office from 1982
to 1996, which made it the most successful European social democratic party of
that period.
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The post-Gonza´lez era began with a dramatic electoral defeat in 2000 and
renewed intra-party dissent – exemplified by the fact that the party conference twice
elected a new party leader who was not chosen by the party leadership.8 When Jose´
Zapatero was elected party leader in 2000, a gradual rejuvenation of the party
began. The negative feedback effect (H3) from electoral defeat and damaging
corruption practices heralded a change of generation in the PSOE leadership
(Encarnacio´n, 2006) as well as the introduction of more democratic measures to
elect candidates (Me´ndez Lago, 2006). These changes led to an increased emphasis
on post-material and identity issues. Despite the negative feedback effect, the
minority Zapatero government that came to power in 2004 continued the economic
policy of Gonzale´z (Royo, 2006). Jose´ Zapatero even appointed the same minister
for economic affairs (Pedro Solbes) as Felipe Gonzalez had done in his last two
cabinets. In terms of unemployment benefits, the Zapatero government implemented
two minor reforms, one easing access to unemployment benefits, the other slightly
decreasing unemployment benefits (Mato, 2011). Zapatero did not change Gonza-
lez’ economic policies because these policies had been effective in capturing the
center of the electorate. This was necessary because the Partido Popular had slowly
moved to the center, which culminated in their winning the 1996 elections. Fighting
for the median voter, Zapatero could not afford to shift to the left on economic
policies, nor was this necessary since intra-party discussion focused on post-material
issues and the left-wing Izquierda Unida became largely irrelevant in electoral terms
after 2000.9
Given the economic boom in Spain, Jose´ Zapatero was in a comfortable
position in the run-up to the 2008 elections. However, with the financial crisis in
the United States, the economy suddenly became an important issue during the
2008 elections, which were narrowly won by the PSOE. His initial policy response
to the crisis was the introduction of a number of temporary measures that would
alleviate the income fall of the newly unemployed. Such measures were very much
in line with how other countries responded to the crisis. The initial understanding
of the problem was that consumer spending should be kept at a certain level to
avoid recession. However, facing great pressures from the financial markets and
other European countries, Zapatero implemented some radical austerity measures
such as freezing pensions and civil servants’ pay and raising the retirement age. By
cutting popular welfare programs and thereby working towards a more balanced
budget, Zapatero tried to evade electoral punishment of voters dissatisfied with
economic performance. This response is very similar to what his predecessor
8 Initially, the left-wing Josep Borrell was chosen in a primary as the prime ministerial candidate for
the 2000 election. The secretary-general of the PSOE, Joaquin Almunia, lost this election. Jose´ Zapatero
was also not the preferred party leadership candidate when he was nominated for the prime ministerial
candidacy (Me´ndez Lago, 2006).
9 In 1996 the Izquierda Unida (IU) secured 21 seats but since then has lost seats rapidly and now only
has 2 seats. Zapatero prefers to cooperate with regional parties to obtain a majority vote. For these
parties the cultural dimension is more important than the economic dimension.
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Gonzalez did and follows the predictions of Hypothesis 2. However, for the PSOE
Zapatero’s drive for austerity was probably too little and too late, because the
party was defeated in the November 2011 elections by the Partido Popular, which
proposed even more radical reforms.
In conclusion, the PSOE followed a centrist trajectory, allowing neoliberal
reforms, but choosing a traditional social democratic approach once unions
mobilized effectively and threatened the maintenance of office pay-offs.
Germany: between traditionalists and modernists
The SPD is characterized by a rather fragmented party structure (regionally
as well as ideologically) and strong organizational ties to trade unions. Both
aspects constitute constraints for office-seeking behavior and make programmatic
reorientation contentious, particularly in areas such as labor market policy
(Merkel and Petring, 2008).
In the 1970s the SPD’s blend of economic pragmatism and traditional social
democratic values formed the foundation for electoral success. Its first government
participation in 1966 was followed by 16 consecutive years in office, most of them
as a senior partner in a coalition with the liberal Free Democratic Party (Freie
Demokratische Partei, FDP) (1969–82). Union interests (most importantly extended
co-determination) ranked high on the SPD’s agenda, particularly under the chan-
cellorship of Brandt (1969–74). Although Schmidt’s ascension to office meant a
strengthened role for the pragmatist’s intra-party faction and more contentious
relations with trade unions (von Beyme, 1990), the policy response to the oil crisis
remained very much in line with traditional social democratic ideology. It relied
mainly on costly labor-supply reduction by means of passive benefits. Despite dete-
riorating labor market performance and growing deficits, the party was reluctant
to adopt far-reaching retrenchment or deregulatory measures. This immobility
eventually led the FDP to walk out of the government and form a new coalition with
the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU), which
seemed to be more open to labor market modernization at the time.
The following 16 years of opposition clearly revealed the SPD’s difficulties
to compete with a strongly welfare-oriented Christian democratic rival. After
some half-hearted deregulation of temporary employment in 1985, the CDU–FDP
coalition followed an expansionary social policy course. After reunification
especially the CDU boosted its popularity by implementing generous passive labor
market policies cushioning the transition process (Zohlnho¨fer, 2003). In this
situation the SPD could hardly win votes by moving to the right. At the same time,
however, the decline of its traditional working-class constituency forced the SPD
to open up to more liberal middle class voters (Egle and Henkes, 2004b).
In this context, the SPD struggled to develop a successful electoral strategy at
the onset of the 1990s. Being torn between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernizers’
posed an additional challenge. The fragile intra-party power balance prevented a
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programmatic reorientation, which would have allowed the party to follow a
coherent office-seeking strategy. This was expressed, for instance, in the high
turnover of party leaders from the late 1980s (Meyer, 1999).10 However, in the
post-reunification period the opportunity structure changed for the better and the
SPD managed to temporarily overcome internal divisions. This was mainly due to
the apparent failure of the government’s labor market policy. As a consequence
of persistently high unemployment and related concerns about the sustainability
of the costly German employment model, the electorate shifted to the right on
economic issues. This, in turn, forced the CDU–FDP government into unpopular
benefits cuts and employment regulation (Picot, 2009).
The government’s rightward programmatic shift opened up space for the SPD in
the middle of the political spectrum. Yet the orientation of the party remained
unclear, especially because competition for the party leadership continued. While
party chairman Oskar Lafontaine represented the traditional wing of the SPD,
Gerhard Schro¨der (who eventually became the candidate for chancellor) clearly
belonged to the modernizing camp (Debus, 2008). This dual leadership led to a
rather vague program. However, it turned out to be beneficial during the 1998
campaign, as contradictory political demands could be catered to (Egle and
Henkes, 2004b; Picot, 2009). In terms of labor market policy, the SPD developed
a promising electoral strategy in line with the demands of its traditional wing: it
announced it would repeal the unpopular reforms introduced by the government,
which eventually contributed to its victory together with the Greens.
The overall tendency of the first term under Schro¨der (1998–2002) was char-
acterized by traditional social democratic labor market policy. The new government
kept its pledge to repeal its predecessor’s reforms. Instead of decreasing benefit
generosity, revenues from the social insurance system were strengthened by obliging
additional groups to pay contributions (Egle and Henkes, 2004a). With regard to
temporary work, the SPD hesitantly tried to counteract the pattern of ‘dual’ labor
law reforms under the CDU–FDP government, which had led to a constant increase
of fixed-term contracts and agency work (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). Although the
new government did not fundamentally change the dual structure of employment
protection, fixed-term contracts without a valid reason were made somewhat
stricter. By and large, the initial labor market policy approach reflected the demands
of the traditional unionist wing of the SPD. During the pre-2001 boom there was no
reason to abandon this popular (and election-winning) strategy. Hence, the interests
of activists and leaders temporarily converged.
However, it soon became clear that the balance between the intra-party factions
remained fragile. The favorable economic situation had biased the policy
approach towards popular measures in line with traditionalists’ interests. Yet
10 After Brandt had led the party for 23 years, the SPD had five different party leaders in the first half
of the 1990s (Vogel, Engholm, Rau, Scharping, and Lafontaine). Altogether the 1990s and 2000s saw
12 different party leaders representing different factions.
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towards the end of the legislative term, unemployment began to rise again, which
made reconciling interests more difficult and provided incentives for the office-
seeking leadership to shift to the right.
Schro¨der II (2002–05) brought about an important turning point in labor market
policy, one which illustrates how the intra-party balance of power and external
reform incentives interact. Against the background of a labor market crisis, falling
approval ratings and disastrous state-level elections, Schro¨der announced ‘Agenda
2010’ (including the ‘Hartz reforms’) in 2003, by German standards a major
package of labor market deregulation and welfare state retrenchment.11 The reform
proposals, launched by the leadership in the face of open opposition within the
party, can be seen as a pragmatic response to the changing incentive structure, in
particular centrist voters’ discontent with labor market performance and budget
deficits. In line with Hypothesis 2, the office-seeking leadership pursued neoliberal
reforms with the aim of reducing unemployment and social expenditure, thereby
safeguarding future office pay-offs. Besides public opinion, the behavior of other
parties supported this strategy. During the 1990s, all major parties had shifted
rightwards in their social and economic policy positions, indicating a consensus on
the need to reform German labor market institutions (Saalfeld, 2006). The SPD was
therefore able to successfully negotiate the reforms with the CDU, and because
there was no significant left-wing competitor, the SPD leadership believed they
would avoid negative vote pay-offs (Picot, 2009).
Traditionalists, who still formed a majority within the party as well as in the
parliamentary group, were clearly opposed to what they perceived as neoliberal
reforms (Debus, 2008; Conradt, 2010). To overcome this veto power, Schro¨der
opted for a confrontational top-down approach. By abandoning intra-party dialogue
and skillfully creating pressure via the media instead, he managed to push through
his agenda (Korte, 2007). One important element was to frame the changes as an
inherent necessity, given Germany’s structural problems. Moreover, Schro¨der relied
on extra-parliamentary commissions to prepare reform proposals rather than on
experts within the SPD (Saalfeld, 2006). At the 2004 party convention, the party
base reluctantly accepted the reforms, which were predominantly seen to contradict
social democratic principles (Meyer, 2007).
But the strategy backfired. A large part of the SPD’s core constituency, traditionalist
party activists, and the unions felt betrayed. As a direct response, a new far-left party
split off and soon merged with the post-communist PDS (Partei des Demokratische
Sozialismus), which previously had its stronghold in the former East Germany (the
new party was called ‘Linkspartei’, later ‘Die Linke’). Die Linke quickly gained
support from disappointed social democratic party members and competed aggress-
ively with the SPD for left-leaning voters on welfare issues (Vail, 2010). Die Linke’s
explicit aim was to revoke the liberal changes of the renegade social democrats. In the
11 See Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst (2009) for an overview.
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subsequent federal elections in 2005 Die Linke did surprisingly well, which con-
tributed to the downfall of the Schro¨der government (Conradt, 2010).
The emergence of a powerful left-wing competitor was an immediate feedback
effect of the Hartz reforms (Hypothesis 3), which created substantial constraints for
the SPD’s course in the subsequent Grand Coalition (2005–09). Moreover, internal
conflict increased in the post-Schro¨der SPD. While the traumatized left majority
pushed for corrections to the previous reforms, the party leadership was still formed
by modernizers who, in principle, sought to protect the political achievements of the
‘Hartz reforms’ (Raschke, 2010). Thus, the SPD had both electoral and intra-party
reasons to shift leftwards. This tendency was supported by the socio-economic
context. Arguably, because of the institutional changes introduced under Schro¨der,
Germany experienced job-intensive growth (until entering the economic crisis in
2008). This shifted public attention from unemployment to growing labor market
inequalities and increased the government’s fiscal leeway for expansionary social
policy (Schmidt, 2010; Eichhorst and Marx, 2011).
New left-wing competition, internal discontent, and the socio-economic back-
ground explain why the SPD rapidly turned from retrenchment to reversing some of
the most unpopular elements of the Hartz legislation.12 It also put minimum wages
on the agenda and agreed with the reluctant CDU on the extension of minimumwage
agreements in specific sectors. This leftward trajectory continued after a disastrous
performance in the 2009 elections, which put an end to the SPD’s government partici-
pation. After obtaining veto power in the upper house of the German parliament, it
pushed the CDU–FDP coalition to implement more generous modifications of social
assistance and better working conditions for agency workers in 2011.
The development of the SPD’s labor market policy approach after 1998 illus-
trates the complex interactions between the intra-party balance of power and
reform incentives as well as the importance of feedback effects. First, in the
ideologically fragmented SPD the socio-economic background and the perceived
pressure for reform had a strong impact on the balance between traditionalists
and modernizers. The party leadership was only able to overcome policy-seeking
veto factions by pointing to the factual constraints created by the labor market
crisis. In times of economic upswings a policy-seeking strategy usually prevailed,
because the interests of leaders and activists converged. Second, the results of
internal conflict created feedback effects. This is illustrated by the emergence of
Die Linke, but also by the internal reorientation within the SPD, which took place
after the political failure of retrenchment.
Comparing cases
Based on the qualitative information gathered in the case studies, we can now specify
the conditions conducive to neoliberal shifts of Social Democratic parties. Table 2
12 Unemployment benefits for older workers were once again extended.
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Table 2. Comparing SPD, PvdA, and PSOE 1975–2010
Turning point Independent variables
When What Intra-party Economy Opposition Public opinion Hypothesis
SPD 2002 Neoliberal Leadership Bad Absent (negotiation) Rightwards shift H2
2005 Social dem. Activists Good Left party Social equality concerns H1 and H3
PvdA Early 1970s Radicalization Activists Bad Left parties No data H1
1991 Neoliberal Leadership Bad Diminished Shift rightwards H2 and H3
PSOE 1984 Neoliberal Leadership Bad None No data H2
1989 Social dem. Leadership Good Unions Leftwards shift
1992 Neoliberal Leadership Bad Not effective Rightwards shift H2
SPD5 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; PvdA5 Partij van de Arbeid; PSOE5 Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol.
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summarizes the explanatory variables at times of turning points in labor market
policy approaches. They indicate that when the party leadership dominates party
activists, party leaders responded to adverse economic situations (and related public
opinion shifts) and had the reasonable expectation they would not be punished
for the reforms (i.e. there was no credible opposition mobilization). This applies to
the SPD (2002), the PvdA (1991) and PSOE (1984 and 1991). This confirms
Hypothesis 2, as is most apparent in the case of the PSOE. The constant leadership
dominance allowed the PSOE to maneuver the party without significant internal
constraints. The high responsiveness to environmental incentives explains the rapid
shifts between social democratic and neoliberal approaches, which all were in line
with an office-seeking strategy. Hence, the PSOE adopted a neoliberal approach
when the economy was going badly and credible opposition mobilization was absent
(1984, 1994), but stressed its social democratic values when the economy improved
and union mobilization threatened its access to office (1989).
The PvdA’s organizational changes confirm the importance of the intra-party
balance of power. Following Hypothesis 1, activists’ dominance ensured that the
party remained on a social democratic track, despite exacerbating economic condi-
tions and exclusion from office. Under similar economic conditions, the Dutch social
democrats rejected the retrenchment policies their Spanish sister-party implemented.
The PvdA switched to a neoliberal response in 1991, because organizational reforms,
motivated by negative feedback effects, had empowered party leaders over party
activists (Hypothesis 3). Admittedly, the potential for opposition mobilization in
the Netherlands decreased somewhat over this period, providing an alternative (or
complementary) explanation for changed party behavior.
Finally, the SPD represents an in-between case, for which the balance between
activists and leaders is rather unstable. Under favorable economic conditions,
the interests of activists and leaders converged and both pushed for a traditional
social democratic agenda. However, under unfavorable economic conditions clashes
between traditionalists and modernists emerged, and only in 2002 did the moder-
nists win this battle and push for neoliberal reforms. Hence, like the PvdA the
response of the SPD to economic troubles was much delayed, in contrast to the swift
response of the PSOE. Also, the unanticipated consequences of the Hartz IV reforms
created a grave crisis for party leaders and re-established activist dominance
(Hypothesis 3). This partly explains the SPD’s return to social democratic policies
after 2005.
Conclusion
Although we examine only three case studies, we contend that additional cases can be
explained by our framework. Comparing reform strategies of other European social
democratic parties along the party organizational dimension, Kitschelt (1994) reveals
broad similarities to our cases. First, the UK Labour Party is much like the PvdA in
terms of party organization. In the early 1980s the radical left obtained a powerful
Social democrats and the choice for neoliberal policies 169
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773912000070
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 16 Jan 2017 at 19:46:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
position within the Labour Party, which radicalized its party program. After rather
dramatic party organizational changes in 1995, Labour shifted to the right, adopting
neoliberal policies. Second, the Spanish and French socialists are both dominated by
their party leaderships. Similarly to the Spanish socialists, the French PS departed
from its ideological position and implemented retrenchment measures in the 1980s
when the economic context called for it. In contrast to the PSOE, the PS’ more social
democratic approach in the 1990s is explained by a pattern of party competition
with left-wing rivals whose support was necessary to obtain a majority in parliament
(e.g. the ‘Gauche plurielle’ under Jospin). Third, the Swedish social democratic party
organization bears resemblance to the SPD’s party organization. Both parties were
reluctant to retrench and fluctuated from traditionalism to neoliberalism and back.
Hence, despite very similar economic conditions, these social democratic parties
differ in their responses to these conditions.
While in-depth research is necessary to strengthen these claims, this brief overview
shows that our explanatory framework provides plausible hypotheses for studies into
the behavior of social democratic parties. The main argument of the paper is that the
intra-party balance of power explains the different behavior of social democratic
parties in a comparative perspective. Our findings show that if the party leadership is
dominant, social democrats turn from a social democratic to a neoliberal labor
market approach if the economy is going badly and credible opposition fails to
materialize (Hypothesis 2). The leadership anticipates that losses due to economic
voting or decreased trust among coalition partners in the party’s ability to weather
economic storms are larger than potential losses due to credible opposition mobili-
zation. Hence, the office-seeking social democratic leadership pursues a neoliberal
course of action to safeguard future office pay-offs. However, social democratic
parties under similar economic conditions choose more social democratic approaches
to the labor market if party activists are strong enough to veto a shift away from the
party’s traditional policies (Hypothesis 1). The choice for social democracy or neo-
liberalism has feedback effects and electoral defeat or exclusion from government
motivate party change and the choice for another strategy (Hypothesis 3).
In conclusion, the larger lesson for the welfare state literature is that political
ideology and economic conditions do not have a generalizable impact on the
welfare state irrespective of the organizational structure of parties. This structure
shapes the strategies parties choose and thereby determines which environmental
incentive is relevant for explaining welfare reform.
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